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THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE:
Part I
DILEMMA OF
DISESTABLISHMENTt
William B. Ball*
Probably no deeper division of our people
could proceed from any provocation than
from finding it necessary to choose what doc-
trine and whose program public educational
officials shall compel youth to unite in em-
bracing.
Justice Robert H. Jackson in West
Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette
(1942).
N OTBING IS MORE SIGNIFICANT about the decision of Engel v. Vitale'
than the substantial step it takes in constricting the free exercise of
religion through an expansion of the concept of disestablishment. For
it is obvious that there is such a thing as the use by a people of their
public institutions and of public practices to express their most indig-
enous sentiments and aspirations, not merely as these pertain to the
civil but indeed as they pertain to the sacral. This is not to affirm or
to deny a right in the people of such collective free exercise but merely
to describe the social fact which results from Engel and certain of its
predecessor (but not precedent) decisions.
An interpretive process, which commenced with the Everson2 de-
cision in 1947 has now come almost full circle, and the uses made of
the "no establishment" clause to sterilize the public schools of theistic
t The conclusion of this article will appear in the next issue of the CATHOLIC
LAWYER.
* A.B., Western Reserve University; J.D., College of Law, University of Notre
Dame. Former Professor of Law, School of Law, Villanova University. Presently,
Executive Director and General Counsel, Pennsylvania Catholic Welfare Com-
mittee.
I- U.S. -, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 4550 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
2 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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religion now forshadow far wider uses
to be attempted. But the end of the
process may well be the casting out of
favored orthodoxies of the disestablishers
- a thing undreamt of when, fifteen
years ago, a new translation of the first
amendment came to be written.
That translation (in Everson) had proved
startling to many a constitutional scholar.3
Historically, the term "establishment of
religion," as employed in the first amend-
ment, had reference to the "establish-
ment," that is, the church.4 In 1947 the
Supreme Court, in effect, translated "es-
tablishment" into "establishing," thus lay-
ing the basis for constitutional attacks
upon any governmental programs which
in any way were promotive of religion
itself.5 With the handing down, on June
, See, e.g., O'NEILL, RELIGION AND EDUCATION
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (1949); Corwin, The
Supreme Court as National School Board, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 11 (1949); Suther-
land, Due Process and Disestablishment, 62
HARV. L. REV. 1306 (1949).
4 Or, as Professor O'Neill has well noted, the
first amendment did not prohibit a law about a
religious "establishment" in the sense of a
church-owned hospital or asylum but "a law
about a monopolistic position of favor to one
religious group .... ." O'NEILL, CATHOLICISM
AND AMERICAN FREEDOM 50 (1952).
5 "Neither [a state nor the federal government]
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another."
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
(1947). Simultaneously, a popular myth, under
the slogan of "separation of church and state,"
has been constructed which imports the concept
of an absolute separation of religion from pub-
lic life. As stated in a paper delivered by the
author at Amherst College, February 14th: "It
is perhaps worth pointing out that those who
have raised this slogan to the status of constitu-
tional dogma have exceeded even the excesses
of the constitutional literalists, because while the
former demand an absolutely literal adherence
to the words of the Constitution, the latter de-
mand absolutely literal adherence to words which
are nowhere to be found in the Constitution."
25th, of the decision of the Supreme
Court in the Engel case, we see a further
explication of the principal concepts gen-
erated in Everson. This article is an at-
tempt to describe and to assess this latest
expansion in the concept of disestablish-
ment.
The Reach of the Holding
The facts of the case involved a gov-
ernmentally composed prayer,G directed
by the State of New York to be recited
daily by public school pupils. But it would
be incorrect to see the holding of the
Court as limited to the fact of prayer-
formulating by government, in spite of
the many references made in the majority
opinion to the facts of prayer-formulating.
Certainly, the holding does not rest upon
the fact of governmental composition. It
can hardly be argued that the identifica-
tion of the author is the controlling point
in the Court's holding since, if this were
so, the broad decisional basis which the
Court announced would be inapposite
and, indeed, a traditional Jewish, Catho-
lic, Methodist, or Buddhist prayer or
prayer peculiar to any other sect- and
more obviously "sectarian" than the New
York prayer- could then be an "of-
ficial" school prayer to be considered
to be not affected by the six majority
Justices who gave us the Engel decision.
The point is not one of composing but
of proposing. It is the fact of govern-
mental offering, sponsorship or encour-
agement which is of the essence. But pro-
posing of what? Prayers only? Apparently
not. More things were wrought by this de-
cision than prayer alone.
6 "Almighty God, we acknowledge our depend-
ence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon
us, our parents, our teachers and our country."
The Court did not strike down the
prayer as unconstitutional, without more;
it struck down the prayer as unconstitu-
tional because it considered it to be a
practice establishing religion in the public
schools. The prayer program, the major-
ity opinion tells us, was offensive because
it constituted "a religious activity,"'7 be-
cause "the nature of such a prayer has
always been religious,"' because it was
"part of a governmental program to fur-
ther religious beliefs," 9 because it "of-
ficially establishes the religious beliefs em-
bodied in the Regents Prayer,"'1 because
it constituted "an establishment of re-
ligious services in public schools."" The
basis for objection thus described, it is
difficult to see that the holding does not
reach a number of practices which have
since been suggested as being unaffected
by it - such as, for example, the Lord's
Prayer, Bible reading, 2 prayers of their
own offered aloud by teachers in the class-
room, official periods for purposes of si-
lent prayer, Christmas, Hanukkah or
Easter celebrations. Certainly, the ma-
jority opinion lends no real basis for dis-
tinguishing prayers from other practices.
And in the absence of a limitation clearly
set forth in the opinion, one would be
hard put to discover the logic of such a
distinction.
Does the holding go outside the schools
to reach any "governmental programs to
7Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. - , 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
LO Id. at 4552.
"Id. at 4553.
12 As a "religious exercise." See discussion infra
at 191 as to what may be considered to be a
religious exercise.
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further religious beliefs"? Certainly, at
many points the majority opinion states
premises readily applicable to such pro-
grams. And it may be argued that the
concurring opinion of Justice Douglas
simply fills in the blank check drawn by
the majority. Thus, in the eye of Justice
Douglas, every sort of governmental pro-
gram which is in any way promotive of
religion 13 is constitutionally offensive. In
this he includes the prayer of the Marshall
opening the sessions of the Supreme Court
13 But Justice Douglas' references are solely to
theistic religious practices. The view is not novel
in American history. Canon Stokes quotes the
1876 platform of the American Secular Union
and Free Thought Federation, led by Robert G.
Ingersoll, as follows:
To effect a total separation of Church and
State, not only in name as it now is but as an
actual fact. Taxation of church property, the
elimination of all religious teaching in the
public schools, and the abolition of all those
clearly unconstitutional measures which are
wrongly called Sunday Laws.
3 STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 594. The American Association for the
Advancement of Atheism, in 1929, published the
following demands:
The United States not being a Christian na-
tion and its godless Constitution requiring a
secular government, the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Atheism de-
mands:
(1) Taxation of church property.
(2) Elimination of chaplains and sectarian
institutions from public payrolls.
(3) Repeal of laws restricting the rights of
Atheists and enforcing Christian morals.
(4) Abolition of the oath in courts and at
inaugurations.
(5) Nonissuance of religious proclamations
by chief executives.
(6) Erasure of the superstitious inscription,
"In God We Trust" from our coins and
the removal of the church flag above the
national flag on battleships.
(7) Exclusion of the Bible as a sacred book
from the public schools.
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and prayers in the Congress. But he also
indicates that the purchase of Christmas
trees by communities with taxpayers' funds
would be unconstitutional 14 and broadly
suggests that many other official endeavors
also are: all forms of aid to activities-
secular or otherwise- being carried out
in church-related institutions, tax exemp-
tions for religious organizations, the chap-
laincies, the Pledge of Allegiance, "In God
We Trust" and references to God in the
Star-Spangled Banner. Respecting some of
these, the majority opinion provides a
rather obscure limitation apparently in
favor of pomp and nationalism. Noting that
"there are many manifestations in our pub-
lic life of belief in God," Justic Black, in
his footnote 21, pronounces his blessing
upon these insofar as they are essentially
"patriotic or ceremonial.' 1 5 Children, he
says, may be "officially encouraged to ex-
press love for our country" (in spite of
references to God in the traditional docu-
ments and anthems). Without explanation,
he finds these to "bear no true resemblance
(8) Suppression of the bootlegging of reli-
gion through dismissing pupils for reli-
gious instruction during school hours.
(9) Secularization of marriage, with di-
vorce upon request.
(10) Repeal of anti-evolution, anti-birth con-
trol, and censorship laws.
Ibid.
'4The point is not precisely stated. Justice
Douglas states: "A religion is not established
in the usual sense merely by letting those who
chose to do so say the prayer that the public
school teacher leads. Yet once government fi-
nances a religious exercise it inserts a divisive
influence into our communities." (Italics sup-
plied.) It is at this point that, by a footnote, he
refers to the purchase of Christmas trees. The
reader is obviously not left entirely clear as to
whether Justice Douglas thinks that a religiously
"divisive influence" offends constitutionality even
though it does not amount to any sort of "estab-
lishment."
to the unquestioned religious exercise" with
which the Engel case was concerned.
Broad though the decision is, there are
nevertheless a few things in the field of
Church-State relationships which neither its
most horror-struck critic nor its most en-
thusiastic supporter can with any logic
claim that it reaches. Perhaps of chief in-
terest in this connection is the question of
whether the decision reaches the further
inclusion of education in church-related
schools in any programs of aid16 which
the federal government may subsequently
enact. However, counsel for the victorious
plaintiffs in Engel has made such a claim,' 7
and some lay opinion' has developed,
doubtless as a result. The claim, however,
appears unsupportable. The facts of the
case concerned religious exercises in public
schools. But Justice Black, the author of
the majority opinion, long ago rendered
clear the distinction between governmental
support of religion and governmental sup-
port of secular activities in so-called "re-
ligious" schools. It was in the Everson case
that Justice Black, speaking for the ma-
jority, stated his oft-quoted declaration as
to the meaning of the no establishment
clause, and it was in this declaration that
15Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. -, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4554 (U.S. June 25, 1962). There
is nothing in footnote 21 to encourage reading
it as a broad exemption from the rule of the
opinion.
16 It appears necessary, in the climate of 1962,
to keep stressing the fact that the federal gov-
ernment has already enacted many such pro-
grams. See, for a summary of the point, The
Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-
Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education,
50 GEO, L.J. 399, 434-37 (1962).
17 Leo Pfeffer, Esq., as quoted in N.Y. Times,
June 26, 1962.
is Columnists Raymond J. Crowley, AP dispatch,
June 27, 1962; David Lawrence, The Patriot
(Harrisburg) June 29, 1962.
he stated that neither a state nor the federal
government "can pass laws which aid one
religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another."'19 Yet it was the pre-
cise holding of the Everson case that the
providing by a state of reimbursement to
parents out of public funds for transporta-
tion of their children to (inter alia) Catholic
parochial schools by public buses was not
violative of the no establishment clause.
This decision carried forward the doctrine
already established 20 that government may
provide aid to secular activities in church-
related institutions, completing its signifi-
cance, however, against a background of
extensive discussion of the meaning of dis-
establishment.
Nothing in the majority opinion in Engel
gives ground to support the contention that
it stands as precedent for a limitation upon
the freedom of government to choose,
among the objects of its support, secular
activities being conducted in church-related
instiutions. Whether the concurring opinion
of one Justice, Justice Douglas, stands for
such a proposition is not clear. The Doug-
las opinion concludes that it is unconstitu-
tional for government to "finance a relig-
ious exercise," regardless of the form which
such financing takes.21 Then in a footnote
the term, "religious exercise," is apparently
made synonymous at least with such activi-
ties as education obtained in church-re-
lated schools under the G.I. Bill of Rights,
nurse training received in denominational
schools, the distribution of surplus food
19 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15, 16
(1947).
20 Cochran v. Board of Educ., 281 U.S. 370
(1930); Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291
(1899)., _
2' Engel y. Vitale, - U.S. - , 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4554 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
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under the National School Lunch Act, hos-
pital construction under the Hospital Sur-
vey and Construction Act of 1946, and the
use of "In God We Trust" on currency.22
It will come as a surprise to many to
learn that the nature of the institution spon-
soring the activity converts the activity
into a "religious exercise" even though the
activity may consist of a course in Alter-
nating Current Machinery II or Funda-
mentals of Life Insurance and Annuities.
23
This, however, is the view solely of Justice
Douglas as expressed in Engel and not the
view of the majority. Not without logic,
considering his premises, Justice Douglas,
in Engel, discovers that he must now de-
clare the Everson case (in which he voted
for school buses for parochial children)
"in retrospect to be out of line with the
First Amendment," 24 and he thus creates
for Justice Rutledge in that case a post-
humous majority. But one is hard put to
see why he did not, in overruling the Jus-
tice Douglas of Everson, likewise, in ex-
press fashion, overrule the Justice Douglas
who spoke for the majority of the Court
in Zorach v. Clauson.21 While an element
of mystery in opinion-writing is always in-
triguing, this instance rises to the dramatic.
For indeed much of "the common sense of
the matter" (to borrow the phrase of Jus-
tice Douglas in Zorach) concerning con-
temporary Church-State problems had been
stated as the majority opinion in the
Zorach case: (1) that the first amendment
"does not say that in every and all respects
there shall be a separation of Church and
22 Ibid.
23 From VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY GENERAL CATA-
LOGUE 42, 45 (1959-60).
24 Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. -, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4554 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
26 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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State"; 2 (2) that otherwise, "the state and
religion would be aliens to each other -
hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly";2 7
(3) that otherwise churches could not be
required to pay property taxes, and all
"references to the Almighty that run
through our laws, our public rituals, our
ceremonies would be flouting the first
amendment"; 2 (4) that "when the state
encourages religious instruction or coop-
erates with religious authorities by adjust-
ing the schedule of public events to sec-
tarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions"; 29 (5) that such encouragement
and cooperation follows the best of our
traditions because "then it respects the re-
ligious nature of our people and accommo-
dates the public service to their spiritual
needs"; 0 (6) to hold that government may
not show such respect or make such ac-
commodation would be "to find in the
Constitution a requirement that the govern-
ment show a callous indifference to re-
ligious groups"; (7) that this would also
"be preferring those who believe in no re-
ligion over those who do believe";81 (8)
that "we are a religious people whose insti-
tutions presuppose a Supreme Being. 2
Only the last-mentioned point receives
comment in the Douglas concurrence in
Engel,3 with the added remark that under
our Bill of Rights "free play is given for
making religion an active force in our
lives" 34 and a footnote somewhat unac-
2eZorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
2f Ibid.
28 Id. at 312, 313.
29 Id. at 314.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Id. at 313.
88 Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. - , 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4556 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
84 Ibid.
countably appended which tells us that (as
shown by the Northwest Ordinance) "re-
ligion was once deemed to be a function of
the public school system. 21 5 The Douglas
concurrence-had it decisional force-
would state a wholly new doctrine of dis-
establishment, one requiring an absolute
separation of Church and State, one to
which all of the views expressed in Zorach
respecting encouragement, cooperation, ac-
commodation, specific ways of "concert or
union or dependency" would be inapplica-
ble. It would be difficult indeed not to
ascribe the result as a triumph for the
"fastidious aetheist or agnostic" 6 whom
Douglas characterizes in Zorach as the
logical objectant to the supplication with
which the Supreme Court opens each ses-
sion. A Question of Authority
If trouble with judicial precedents is
encountered in the Douglas opinion, none
can be encountered in the majority opinion.
No judicial precedents are cited. No at-
tempt is made to link up its social and
philosophic assertions with anything which
the Court ever decided in the past. This
is surprising, especially in view of the fact
that concepts of disestablishment and free
exercise-indeed in relation to the schools
-had been worked over by the Court and
by Justice Black in prior cases.87 But no
relationships to concepts expressed in Mc-
ColluM,3 8 Everson or Zorach are estab-
35 Ibid.
36 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
27 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947); Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson,
343 U.S. 306 (1952).
38 Justice Douglas in Engel states: "McCollum
v. Board of Education . . . does not decide this
case." Engel v. Vitale, U.S. - , 30
U.S.L. WEEK 4550, 4555 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
lished, and just as there has already been
speculation as to whether the Court, in
view of the storm of protest over Engel,
may make a retreat similar to the retreat
it made from McCollum to Zorach, so will
it likewise doubtless be argued that the
Court has now retraced its steps from the
spirit of Zorach back to the letter of Mc-
Collum. But whatever one may say of the
absence of judicial precedent, the presence
in the opinion of nonjudicial precedent
poses even greater difficulties. Justice
Black's supporting footnotes represent a
guided tour through selected areas of his-
tory - with an astounding result: we are
led to the conclusion that were the Found-
ing Fathers of the United States alive to-
day, they would have supported the ousting
of the Regents Prayer from the New York
schools.
This is more of that singular view of his-
tory already dominant in Everson and Mc-
Collum whereby religion (theistic religion,
that is) appears in a wholly negative role,
as a perpetual disturber of the peace, and
a thing to be kept severely quarantined
to the dark recesses of the most private.
Here, religion-theistic religion, that is-
as representing a vital force and an im-
mensely important tradition in American
life-including American public affairs-
is unrecognized.3 9 This view of history is
constructed, however, upon disturbingly
sparse materials,40 none of which may be
3 However, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Stewart emphatically supplies such recognition.
Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. - , 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4555 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
40 Chiefly COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS Lm-
ERTY IN AMERICA (1902), FISKE, THE CRITICAL
PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1899), and
Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance Against
Religious Assessments, 2 WRITINGS OF MADISON
183.
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properly regarded as connected with the
drafting of the. first amendment. 41 The
closest connection which the Court attempts
is quotation from Madison's Memorial and
Remonstrance against Religious Assess-
ments, which antedated by four years
the deliberations which resulted in the final
draft of the first amendment. Indeed the
sole historical reference in point to be
found in the opinions of the six Justices
who voted down the Regents Prayer ap-
pears in footnote 9 of the concurrence of
Justice Douglas wherein he states:- "Re-
ligion was once deemed to be a function
of the public school system," citing the
Northwest Ordinance (italics supplied).
The Northwest Ordinance, of course, di-
rectly linked religion with the schools. 42
It antedated, as Justice Douglas notes, the
first amendment but, as he fails to note,
was re-enacted by the First Congress at
the very height of the deliberations over the
wording of the religion clauses of the first
amendment, which wording, as we now
have it, was finally approved by that Con-
gress September 25, 1789.43 Indeed the
Southwest Ordinance, containing the same
article relating to religion in education, was
passed by the same Congress in 1790.
So it must with reluctance be concluded
that the authority upon which the majority
41 As Justice Stewart, dissenting, stated: "What
is relevant to the issue here is not the history
of an established church in sixteenth-century
England or in eighteenth-century America, but
the history of the religious traditions of our
people, reflected in countless practices of the in-
stitutions and officials of our government." Engel
v. Vitale, - U.S. -, 30 U.S.L. WEEK
4550, 4557 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
42 "Religion, morality and knowledge, being nec-
essary to good government and the happiness
of mankind, schools and the means of educa-
tion shall be forever encouraged."
43 Annals of Congress, Vol. I, pp. 913 and 88.
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opinion rests is solely Justice Black. This
becomes an especially troublesome aspect
of the case, considering, as we shall,
44
that the judgment of the Court may be
deemed theological in nature.
Judicial Review: Suing to Stand?
Not the least intriguing aspect of the
Engel case is the question of standing to
sue. The issue of standing was not raised
in the case. Broad statements appearing in
the majority opinion, however, raise a se-
rious question as to whether the require-
ments of standing have not now under-
gone serious modification. The Court in its
opinion had nothing to say upon the sub-
ject of any injury encountered by the plain-
tiffs, going no farther than hinting at the
possibility of some sort of coercion-at
most, "indirect"-discussing the supposed
effects of the prayer upon the life of so-
ciety in general. Justice Douglas said he
discovered no element of proselytizing in
the New York practice, nor indoctrination
or exposition. Apparently his own Weltan-
schauung led him to observe that "if
government interferes in matters spiritual,
it will be a divisive force," 4 5 and he evi-
dently thought it the business of the judici-'
ary to stop "divisive" practices by govern-
ment. But as to the plaintiffs, he found "no
element of compulsion or coercion in New
York's regulation."
Should the plaintiff parents have been
considered to have standing to sue? Viewed
in the light of prior Supreme Court deci-
sions in religion cases, this is not clear.
46
4- See discussion infra at 195.
45 Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. -, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4556 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
46 See generally O'Toole, Quis Custodiet: Dis-
establishment and Standing to Sue, 7 CATHOLIC
LAWYER 203 (1961).
In Doremus v. Board of Educ.47 the
plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment
that a New Jersey statute requiring reading,
without comment, of five verses of the Old
Testament each day in the public schools
violated the no establishment clause of the
federal constitution. One of the two plain-
tiffs was the parent of a child who attended
a school in which the Bible reading prac-
tice took place. This child had graduated
from the public schools before the appeal
in that case was taken to the Supreme
Court. The Supreme Court held the parent
to have no standing. Speaking of the child
and the program, Justice Jackson, for the
majority noted:
There is no assertion that she was injured
or even offended thereby or that she was
compelled to accept, approve or confess
agreement with any dogma or creed or even
to listen when the Scriptures were read. On
the contrary, there was a pretrial stipulation
that any student ... could be excused dur-
ing Bible reading and that in this case no
such excuse was asked. 48
Referring to the fact that she had already
graduated at the time of the appeal, the
Court concluded that "no decision we
could render now would protect any rights
she once may have had .... 49
The implication from the first quotation
is that a showing of injury, or of compul-
sion to accept a creed, would be necessary
to standing. This is, of course, in accord-
ance with traditional doctrine of judicial
review. 50 The implication from the second
47 342 U.S. 429 (1951).
48 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429,
432 (1951).
49 d. at 433.
50 "The Court will not pass upon the validity of
a statute upon the complaint of one who fails
to show that he is injured by its operation."
Brandeis, J., concurring in Ashwander v. Ten-
nessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
quotation reinforces the point of the first:
the standing of the parent to sue derives
from an asserted violation of a legal right
in the child or injury to him. But what
is the nature of that right? In the few cases
which have dealt with the no establishment
clause of the first amendment, little guid-
ance is to be found. So far as McCollum is
concerned, it has been suggested that the
humiliation caused to the child by being
set apart in a released time program might
have constituted the injury, or violation of
right, which created his parent's standing.
But Justice Black, who spoke for the ma-
jority, gave no reason. Justice Jackson
doubted that the asserted "humiliation"
provided the Court any jurisdictional basis:
The complaint is that when others join and
he does not, it sets him apart as a dissenter,
which is humiliating. Even admitting this
to be true, it may be doubted whether the
Constitution which, of course, protects the
right to dissent, can be construed also to
protect one from the embarrassment that
always attends nonconformity, whether in
religion, politics, behavior or dress. Since
no legal compulsion is applied to complain-
ant's son himself and no penalty is imposed
or threatened from which we may relieve
him, we can hardly base jurisdiction on this
ground.5'
In the subsequent Zorach case, the Court
touched only in the briefest fashion upon
the question of standing, stating merely
that no problem of standing was here posed
since, unlike the parent in Doremus, the
parents in Zorach had their children cur-
rently in the schools in question.
In the Doremus, McCollum and Zorach
cases, the question of standing of a plain-
tiff as taxpayer was also posed. In Doremus
the Court denied the taxpayer's standing
51 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 233 (1947).
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both on the ground that state moneys were
involved and on the ground that the
grievance was "not a direct dollars-and-
cents injury but . . . a religious diffe-
rence." 5 3 In McCollum, the Court, as
noted, gave no reason for supporting the
plaintiff's standing. Local moneys, rather
than state moneys, it should be noted, were
involved. Justice Jackson, in his concur-
rence, stated that no basis for jurisdiction
could rest, in the case, upon the plaintiff's
status as taxpayer, because the cost of op-
erating the religion program involved was
"neither substantial nor measurable.' 5 4 The
Zorach opinion made no reference to the
fact that the plaintiffs might have had
standing as taxpayers. It is to be noted that
state, not local, moneys were involved in
that case and that the cost of the program
could scarcely have been more "substantial
or measurable" than the cost of the Illinois
program.
In Engel v. Vitale the Court says that
the no establishment clause is violated by
the fact of an enactment which establishes
an official religion. It says that the free
exercise clause is not violated by the fact
of any enactment but only by governmental
action which coerces people:
Although these two clauses may in certain
instances overlap, they forbid two quite
different kinds of governmental encroach-
ment upon religious freedom. The Estab-
lishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise
Clause, does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which
establish an official religion whether those
5 The Court cited Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923).
53 Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429,
434 (1951).
54 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
supra note 51, at 234.
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laws operate directly to coerce nonobserv-
ing individuals or not."5
In terms of standing to sue, did not the
Court thereby say, in effect, that its juris-
diction could be invoked by the mere fact
of the filing of a complaint that a statute
exists which is asserted to breach the no
establishment clause? Evidently coercion
need not be shown. Under this doctrine,
what is the character of the parties com-
plainant? They are not persons having
standing to sue but persons who have
standing because suing."' This doctrine of
suing to stand will obviously raise other
questions due to its relationship to the
"case or controversy" requirement 7 and
the related policy of refusal of advisory
opinions.'8 It may indeed be asked whether,
in the field of no establishment cases, the
doctrine has now been cast aside that one
who attacks a statute as unconstitutional
must show that as applied to him the sta-
tute is invalid."' There are the strongest in-
ferences in the majority opinion that one
need but assert that some sort of "estab-
lishment" activity affects mankind, and the
presumed injury to society gives one stand-
ing to sue.60 Of extraordinary significance
55 Engel v. Vitale, - U.S. - , 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 4550, 4552 (U.S. June 25, 1962).
56 "Apparently the sole purpose and the only
function of plaintiffs is that they shall assume
the role of actors so that there may be a suit
which will invoke a court ruling upon the con-
stitutionality of the statute." Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 5 N.J. 435, 439, 75 A.2d 880 (1950).
'5 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
58 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911).
59 See Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
6O Justice Douglas, in his concurrence, even hints
that "establishment" activity need not be shown
but that a "divisive influence" arising from gov-
ernment financing of religious exercises may suf-
fice to give standing. Engel v. Vitale, - U.S.
, 30 U.S.L. WEEK 4550, 4556 (U.S. June
25, 1962).
is the apparent special withdrawal of the
no establishment clause from ordinary prin-
ciples of judicial review - a withdrawal
which can only lead to a proliferation of
litigation concerning religion. This appears
a reflection, in terms of judicial review,
of the evident preoccupation of the Court
with religion (theistic religion, that is) as a
divisive and disturbing force in society and
one to be kept in severest quarantine.
The Heart of the Matter:
What is "Religion"?
The Regents Prayer was struck down
by the Court as a religious exercise. The
Court has long since discarded the tradi-
tional meaning of an "establishment of
religion." While once the term was under-
stood to mean a church or sect,6 1 the Court
in 1947 decided that it should mean not
only a religion but religion itself.'; The
term, "religion," had long been thought to
refer to theistic" religion. The Court, in
Davis v. Beason defined "religion" as fol-
lows:
The term "religion" has reference to one's
views of his relations to his Creator, and to
the obligations they impose of reverence
for his being and character, and of obedi-
ence to his will. 4
61 Corwin, The Supreme Court as National
School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 11,
12 (1949).
62 Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947).
63 Madison, referring not to establishment but to
religion, described religion as "the duty which
we owe to our Creator and the Manner of our
discharging it." Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments, 2 WRITINGS OF
MADISON 183. Jefferson, similarly, spoke of
religion as "a matter which lies solely between
man and his God." Letter to Danbury Baptist
Association, 8 JEFF. WORKS 113.
64 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1889).
Such has been the traditional and ac-
cepted view. However, in 1961, in Torcaso
v. Watkins,65  the Supreme Court an-
nounced a new definition of the term. The
case involved an appointee to the office of
notary public in Maryland who was refused
a commission to serve because he would
not declare his belief in God and was there-
fore barred from the office by virtue of a
provision of the Maryland Constitution re-
quiring such oath as a qualification for of-
fice. The plaintiff appointee claimed that
this provision violated his rights of freedom
of belief under the first amendment. The
Supreme Court upheld the plaintiff's con-
tention, not rendering it clear, however,
whether it intended to say that his "free-
dom of belief" was specifically protected
by the free exercise clause, the no estab-
lishment clause, or both.6 Stating, how-
ever, that neither a state nor the federal
government can "aid those religions based
on a belief in God as against those religions
founded on different beliefs,"'67 the Court,
in footnote 11, amplified its definition of
religions founded on "different beliefs":
Among religions in this country which do
not teach what would generally be consid-
ered a belief in the existence of God are
Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secu-
lar Humanism and others.6"
65 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
66 The Court appears to have relied chiefly upon
the latter clause, due to the emphasis it placed
upon quotation from the Everson case. Torcaso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
67 Id. at 495. (Italics supplied.) A federal dis-
trict court is reported as having ruled that Black
Muslimism is a religion within the meaning of
the first amendment. The doctrinal core of this
group appears to be racial, with the preachment
of Negro supremacy. See N.C.W.C. News Serv-
ice July 3, 1962.
68 Ibid. The Human Rights Commission of the
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The Court cited, inter alia, the case of
Washington Ethical Soc'y v. District of
Columbia,69 wherein it was ruled that a
statute granting a tax exemption to "reli-
gious societies" must be construed to in-
clude Ethical Culture though this was not
a religion requiring "a belief and teaching
of a Supreme Being who controls the uni-
verse."
There are, of course, various senses in
which "religion" (whether theistic or non-
theistic) may be taken: (a) as a cult, sect,
church or establishment, an organization
of adherents, (b) as worship-e.g., prayer,
(c) as a part of culture, (d) as precept, a
body of truths or doctrines expressing an
oughtness, world outlook, way of life.
As has been noted, the Court, since
Everson, has not limited the term "re-
ligion" as used in the first amendment to
United Nations has had under study the ques-
tion of defining religion. The Special Rapporteur
for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-
crimination and Protection of Minorities in 1960
proposed that in view of the difficulty of defin-
ing "religion," the term "religion or belief" 'be
substituted and that this should be understood
to include, "in addition to various theistic creeds,
such as other beliefs as agnosticism, free
thought, atheism and rationalism." Krishna-
swami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter
of Religious Rights and Practices 1. Parallels to
the Court's naming of Ethical Culture and Secu-
lar Humanism as religions, will be noted in the
Special Rapporteur's further comment that"great
religions and beliefs are based upon ethical
tenets such as the duty to widen the bounds of
good-neighborliness and the obligation to meet
human need in the broadest sense." Ibid. See
also Barrett, United Nations and Religious Lib-
erty, SOCIAL ORDER 265 (June 1961). The Com-
mission's deliberations in 1962 have been con-
cerned with the same problem. An N.C.W.C.
News Service dispatch dated March 19, 1962
reported that the Polish representatives insisted
that the term "religion or belief" include "ra-
tionalist convictions, including atheism."
69 249 F.2d 127 (1960).
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mean a cult, sect or church. As has also
been noted, the Court, in Engel, considered
worship in the schools by means of prayer
to be "religion" within the first amend-
ment's meaning. As to the third possible
meaning of the term, namely, as an ele-
ment of culture, the Court has not yet had
occasion to rule, and the matter of ruling
(given the extreme uses to which the first
amendment is today being put) may not
prove easy.7'
The fourth meaning of the term is un-
deniably the most significant in the light
of the concerns which the Court has ex-
pressed with respect to the supposed evil
effects of even the slightest, briefest, most
"neutral," noncompulsory reminder of God
in the classroom. Although the Court, in
Engel, stated that the mere prescription
of the Regents Prayer program violated the
no establishment clause, it did not hesitate
to make clear what it considered to be the
essential mischief in the program. This was
the establishing of beliefs .71 Recalling, how-
ever, that nontheistic religion now qualifies
as "religion" within the meaning of the
first amendment, it is also clear that such
nontheistic religion is embraced in the
70 May a History of Methodism be taught under
public auspices? Suppose that as the instructor
understands history, he comes to admire Wesley
and Methodism, and that his teaching reflects
this? May he be required to teach the course
from the point of view of an antagonist to Meth-
odism? But if he does not, then may he not be
teaching as much "of" Methodism as "about"
Methodism? Or, is the History of Methodism-
however taught (and finding the "true" in his-
tory is often impossible) simply a part of the
domain of secular knowledge? Cf., LaNoue,
The National Defense Education Act and "Secu-
lar" Subjects, PHI DELTA KAPPAN (June 1962).
Such are the Absurdities into which we are led
by the doctrine of absolute separation of reli-
gion from matters public.
71 See footnotes 8 through 11 supra.
preceptive sense by the clauses of the first
amendment. The preceptive aspect of "re-
ligion," as used therein, was recognized
long ago by the Court. 2 It received ex-
plicit recognition in Torcaso. The Ethical
Culture Movement, recognized as a re-
ligion therein, is described as follows:
A national movement of Ethical (Culture)
societies-religious and educational fellow-
ships based on ethics, believing in the
worth, dignity and fine potentialities of the
individual, encouraging freedom of thought,
committed to the democratic ideal and
method, issuing in social action . "
Secular Humanism, also denominated a re-
ligion by the Court in Torcaso, is a religion
even more markedly preceptive.
In view of the Court's conferral upon
"Ethical Culture. Secular Humanism and
others' 7 1 of the constitutional status of "re-
ligion," it is moreover plain that these be-
come all but indistinguishable from any
other expressions of ideological orthodoxy.
Previous to the Torcaso decision, the Su-
preme Court had essayed a distinction
between a public school education which
was ideologically "neutral" and one which
was ideologically partisan. For example, in
the Barnette case the Court stated:
Free public education, if faithful to the
ideal of secular instruction and political
neutrality, will not be partisan or enemy of
any class, creed, party, or faction.7'5
The words italicized provided a general
description of areas which were out of
bounds for partisan comment or value-in-
culcation. The concept was further stressed
'- Davis v. Beeson, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1889).
7.1 1961 YEARBOOK OF AMERICAN CHURCHES 47
(1961).
74 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495
(1961).
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1942). (Italics sup-
plied.)
in the now famous passage from the same
opinion:
If there is any fixed star in our constitu-
tional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citi-
zens to confess by word or act their faith
therein.78
This simplification of matters accounted
for everything except the realities of the
educational process. Education, "the very
foundation of good citizenship,"77 is as
much a value-acquiring experience as it
is an information-acquiring experience, and
indeed that which appears as information-
giving is often in fact value-inculcation.7 s
The educational process, so far as it per-
tains to the young, at least, must inevitably
concern moral judgments, concepts of what
is "good" (even though this may be ex-
pressed as what is "useful"), value-expres-
sions respecting conduct, history, public
figures and movements, nation and possibly
such matters today as intergroup relation-
ships, the meaning of democracy, commu-
nism, neutralism.
This leads to two questions: First, are
there establishments of nontheistic re-
ligions or practices imposing ideological
disciplines or orthodoxies in the public
schools today? Second, what is the effect
76 Id. at 642.
77 "It is the very foundation of good citizen-
ship. Today it is a principal instrument in awak-
ening the child to cultural values, in preparing
him for later professional training, and in help-
ing him adjust normally to his environment."
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1953).
78 For excellent general commentary, see BLUM,
FREEDOM OF CHOICE IN EDUCATION, especially
Chapter 5 thereof, Freedom to Choose a God-
Centered Education.
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upon these of Engel v. Vitale?
it cannot be doubted that nontheistic
religions are widely established in public
schools in the United States. 79 Doctrines of
Secular Humanism, for example, are offi-
cially inculcated precisely in those areas of
the educational process which most closely
relate to life, its meaning, how it shall be
conducted, and man's relationship to man
and the universe. It is neither to decry nor
to scorn these efforts to state the fact that
they exist. It should not occasion surprise
that they should exist because, by means
of one "religion" or another, society,
through its schools, will inevitably seek to
direct the young in the business of living,
especially with respect to the foregoing
essential matters. It is all very well to assert
that "the state may not reach for a man's
soul"' 0 and to assume that because no
theistic religion or "orthodoxy" is permit-
ted in the school, that therefore the school
is "neutral" and has tidily left concerns for
the soul to the individual, to parents or the
home.
A typical example of the inculcation of
nontheistic religious doctrines in the pub-
lic schools is found in the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania's recently published Guide
to Intergroup Education in Schools."' It is
officially described as "initiating a program
relating to the central core of our free
democratic society. '8 2 Its effect is intended
79 It is to be hoped that the most detailed sur-
vey of the extent of permeation of such religion
in public school curricula and teaching soon will
be undertaken.
8 The phrase is that of Dr. Theodore Powell.
See his paper, Religion and Education, presented
before a meeting of The National Conference
of Christians and Jews, New York, May 9-10,
1962.
8 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Our
Greatest Challenge-Human Relations (1962).
82d. at 1.
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to be, not compartmentalized, but perva-
sive:
It involves every aspect of the school pro-
gram . . . intergroup education must be a
part of the study of every subject; it must
be part of the fiber of every teacher." '
And it is indicated that there can be no
ideally perfect education which is not inter-
group. ("No Guide is more important to
building a strong democracy from within
our society") . Beliefs are officially pro-
moted at the outset:
Is not the fundamental base of democracy
the belief in the dignity and worth of each
individual and equal opportunity for each
to develop his maximum potential?"'
The Guide aims at the molding of the
pupil's attitudes, beliefs, and behaviorY'
Specific orthodoxies are to be inculcated.
For example, among the student attitudes
to be developed is:
Respect for the rights of each citizen to
equal protection under the law and equal
opportunity to secure education, employ-
ment, housing, and the use of public ac-
commodations, as basic to democracy. 7
It is to be noted that respect for the rights
listed is supplied a philosophic basis, and
that the basis selected ("as basic to democ-
racy") is Secular Humanist rather than, say
Christian Humanist (e.g., "as basic to hu-
man beings created by God"). A strong
note of partisanship for the philosophy of
environmental determinism is apparent as
seen in the following attitude to be incul-
cated:
Realization that differences in attitudes and
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid
85 Ibid.
16 Id. at 7.
'171bid. (Italics supplied.)
behavior are determined largely by one's
cultural environment. .... 's
The text outlines a very extensive govern-
mental program for the resolution of ad-
mittedly critical problems in human rela-
tions, but according to selected philosophic
principles which necessarily exclude other
philosophic prinicples8 9
It may now be asked what the effect of
Engel v. Vitale is upon establishments of
nontheistic religions and officially intro-
duced nontheistic orthodoxies. The force
of the decision is such as necessarily to ex-
clude these, too, from the public schools.
This conclusion is based as thoroughly in
justice as it is in what the Supreme Court
has defined "religion" to be. If it be
deemed that the same Court which has
inveighed against all ideological ortho-
doxies in the public schools, and which has
stated that Secular Humanism and Ethical
Culture are religions, has limited the
premises of Engel to theistic religions,
then this is to say that the Court in Engel
has rendered a theological judgment. And
the implications of such a judgment are
enormous. These implications go far be-
yond questions of abuse of judicial power;
they relate to freedom of religion in its
fullest and most essential sense.
Assuming, however, that the decision of
the Court is not to be read as a theological
88 Id. at 9.
89 Philosophic principle is expressed in the "neu-
tral" general curriculum. "It is a fallacy to sup-
pose that by omitting a subject you teach noth-
ing about it. On the contrary you teach that
it is to be omitted, and that it is therefore a
matter of secondary importance. And you teach
this not openly and explicitly, which would in-
vite criticism; you simply take it for granted and
thereby insinuate it silently, insidiously, and all
but irresistibly ... " MOBERLY, THE CRISIS IN A
UNIVERSITY, as quoted in BLUM, FREEDOM OF
CHOICE IN FDUCATION 98.
judgment, then Secular Humanist programs
in the public schools must bear the full
brunt of the teachings of Engel, McCollum
and Everson, with the myriad implications
which this must involve. If Ethical Culture
and Secular Humanism are to enjoy the
benefits of free exercise (because they are
religions) they cannot avoid the rigors of
disestablishment. There is no possibility,
under the Constitution, for giving prefer-
ence to nontheistic religions over theistic
religions, 90 and the thought would be in-
tolerable, that the Court should ever call
nontheistic religions "religions" in terms
of protection for these, but consider them
non-religions in terms of impositions by
them. Under that reading of the Engel
case, it is fully expectable that the public
schools will become centers of contention
respecting fact and content of all manner
of curricular offerings relating to ethics,
social outlook, democratic living, inter-
,"Neither [a state nor the federal government]
can pass laws which . . . prefer one religion over
another." Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15 (1947).
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group relations and various other presently
protected sanctuaries of presently preached
orthodoxies.
This latter reading is, unhappily, the best
face that can be put upon the Engel deci-
sion. For it will now be recognized that if
it is an unlawful injection of religion into
a public school to teach that the brother-
hood of man rests upon the Fatherhood of
God, so must it be to teach that the
brotherhood of man rests upon "demo-
cratic needs" or that it does not rest upon
the Fatherhood of God. Dogma is dogma.
Value-teaching is value-teaching. Religion
is religion. Orthodoxies are orthodoxies.
The Court has thus brought American
public school education to a dilemma and
the correctness of Justice Jackson's remark
quoted at the beginning of this article is
manifest. The Court has expressed concern
for the divisiveness alleged to be caused
by an almost universally desired reminder
of God in the public schools. But its action
will likely presage that "deeper division"
of which Justice Jackson speaks,
(To be Continued)
